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Sensor data is processed to assess performance and health of complex systems.  
Proper sensor selection, placement, and implementation are critical to build an effective 
health management system.  For complex systems in which the timely assessment of the 
health is desired to avoid expensive consequences of failure, sensor placement is vital.  
The ability to identify a critical failure early is completely dependent on sensor location 
within the fault propagation path.  A strategy for assessing a sensor suite with respect to 
timely critical failure detection is presented in this thesis.  To illustrate the strategy, Fault 
Propagation Timing Analysis (FPTA) will be performed on the Rocketdyne RS-68 rocket 
engine.   
The strategy consists of building directed graphs to represent the architecture and 
flows of the system.  These graphs identify potential fault propagation paths for any 
selected failure mode located at a node.  Fault propagation times are then generated for 
each arc and node within the propagation path.  Locations where the fault propagation 
terminates are identified as critical effect nodes within the system.  Candidate sensor 
suites may then be inserted into the graph.  Time to detect is then compared to the time to 
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Effective design of health management systems for complex systems represents 
an important challenge in engineering.  Health management deals with the timely 
detection, diagnosis and correction of abnormal behavior caused by faults in a system.  
Early detection and diagnosis of faults while the system is still operating in a controllable 
environment may help avoid progression of faulty behavior to a critical point.  The Space 
Shuttle Columbia accident represents a strong case for the effective design of health 
management systems.  If the effects of the foam strike were detectable and diagnosable 
before the shuttle attempted reentry the catastrophe might have been avoided.    
The input data that Health Management Systems (HMS) require to make 
assessments of the status of a system originates from sensors.  Positions of sensors, along 
with implementation define the range of potentially critical failures that a HMS may 
isolate.  Isolation of critical failures is required for a HMS to potentially compose a 
corrective action.  The corrective action may take the form of switching to a redundant 
channel, activating a mitigation mechanism, or sending notification to an interested 
source.  In all cases, the corrective action must take place before a fault propagates to a 
critical situation.  Making a diagnosis of the system in a timely manner requires sensors 
to be located at or near the point of fault origination.  It is desired to have the ability to 
analyze candidate sensor suites with respect to the ability to sense critical failure modes 
in a timely manner. 
Complex systems, such as aerospace systems, are developed through a series of 
design reviews.  Within each design cycle different design considerations are studied.  
All components under consideration must demonstrate a clear added value to the system.  
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The costs and risks associated with the complex system drive the design cycles to 
eliminate any components that are not able to demonstrate their value to the design.  
When considering sensors to contribute to an effective HMS system the challenge is to be 
able to justify each measurement’s existence in terms of added value to the system.    
There are a myriad of tradeoffs when considering an optimal sensor suite for any 
given system.  Parameters such as weight, cost, time constants, etc., have to be compared 
against each other to assemble a candidate sensor suite with the goal of meeting the 
requirements imposed upon the system.  The sensor suite evaluation strategy described in 
this thesis primarily addresses a time to detect requirement.  The evaluation provides for 
time to criticality to be assessed as well, allowing a comparison between the two times to 
identify sensor suite effectiveness.  There exists a race condition between HMS being 
able to sense and react to a failure, and the time for off-nominal behavior caused by that 
failure to propagate to a critical condition.  A timeline that defines the events that lead up 
to criticality is shown in Figure 1.1. The goal, in this thesis, is to select a sensor suite that 




Figure 1.1. Time to Criticality Timeline 
 
 
The Rocketdyne RS-68 rocket was selected to demonstrate the sensor suite 
evaluation strategy.  The RS-68 is the first new U.S. engine certified to fly since the 
Space Shuttle Main Engine over 20 years ago.  The RS-68 has also been selected to boost 
the first stage of the Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle that is part of the next generation of 
launch vehicles in NASA’s exploration vision.  Fault Propagation Timing Analysis 
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(FPTA) is performed on the RS-68 to demonstrate how a hypothetical sensor suite 
performs with respect to the time to detect. 
Chapter 2 is a literature review of sensor selection strategies that have been 
developed.  Failure identification and analysis methods are also described.  Deficiencies 
of these concepts are identified and represent the opportunity for improvement that FPTA 
offers in being able to evaluate a sensor suite and its ability to detect faults in a timely 
manner.  Chapter 3 describes the FPTA method and how it is implemented to evaluate a 
sensor suite.  FPTA is then implemented on Rocketdyne’s RS-68 rocket engine in chapter 




2. LITERATURE REVIEW   
Sensor selection strategies for complex systems are numerous and have a broad 
range of approaches to meet each individual system’s needs.  The intended purpose for 
each of the sensor suites implemented in these systems dictates the aspects that need to be 
addressed during the selection process.   Maul, et al. (2007) describe the sensor selection 
process in two parts: an evaluation module and an optimization module.  These modules 
will be used to demonstrate past sensor selection strategies.   
 
2.1. SENSOR SELECTION EVALUATION 
 
 The effectiveness of a particular sensor suite is evaluated by identifying the 
requirements that need to be addressed within a system, and the ability of the selected 
sensors to meet those requirements.  The degrees to which a sensor selection meets those 
requirements can be defined as the Figures of Merit (FOMs) of the system.  A set of 
FOMs reflects the objectives of the sensor suite selection process.  Sensor selection 
strategies described in this section will be presented with regard to how they address the 
following figures of merit identified by Maul, et al. (2007). 
• Observability: This category considers how well the sensor suite will provide 
information about the given system process, which parameters that are directly 
observed, and which parameters can be inferred. 
• Sensor Reliability/Sensor Fault Robustness: This category addresses sensor 




• Fault Detectability / Fault Discriminability: This category specifically addresses 
whether the sensor suite can detect and discriminate system failures. 
• Cost: This category can include development, purchase, and maintenance costs 
for the sensors as well as resource and communication costs. 
 
2.2. OPTIMIZATION PROCESS 
 
 Sensor selection problems addressing the before mentioned FOMs require fast 
approximate search solutions to produce results in a timely manner.  There are several 
methods that have been developed which refine searches through identification of 
possible candidates to find the optimal solution.  The following is an introduction to some 
of these general optimization strategies. 
• Debouk, et al. (1999), apply constraints on an objective function to streamline the 
optimization process.   
• Worden (2001) applies advanced artificial analysis techniques such as genetic 
algorithms and simulated annealing algorithms. 
• Eberhart (1995) proposed particle swarm optimization that is a population based 
stochastic technique. 
• Osorio (2004) describes a cutting and surrogate constraint analysis that uses 
constraint pairing and an initial integer solution to combine the dual surrogate 
constraint with the objective function to generate new constraints. 
 This list is a representation of the variety of algorithms available to produce an 
optimized solution.  Optimizations techniques are not reviewed in detail here, but the 
methods have been well documented by Fletcher (1987).  A set of sensor selection 
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optimization techniques and the associated references are listed in Table 2.1 that was 
generated by Maul, et al. (2007). 
 
 
Table 2.1. Sensor Selection Optimization Techniques and References 
Optimization technique Researcher 
Constrain-Based Search Narasimhan, et al. (1998), Mushini (2005) 
Exhaustive/Brute Force Search Debouk, et al. (1999), Mushini (2005), 
Narasimhan, et al. (1998), Madron (1992), 
Worden (2001) 
Genetic Algorithms Musulin, et al. (2005), Mushini (2005), 
Spanache, et al. (2004), Sen, et al. (1998), 
Santi, et al. (2005), Worden (2001) 
Particle Swarm Optimization Zhang (2005) 
Graph Theory: Spanning Trees and Cutsets Ali (1993 and 1995), Bagajewicz (1997 
and 1999) 
Cutting and Surrogate Constraint Analysis Azam, et al. (2004) 
Mixed Linear Integer Programming Bagajewicz (2000, 2002, and 2004), 
Chemielewski, et al. (2002) 








2.3. REVIEW OF SENSOR SELECTION PROCESSES 
 
The first three Figures of Merit (FOMs) that Maul, et al. (2007) describe are used 
to guide the review of sensor selection processes that have been developed.  The fourth 
FOM, cost, is a straightforward penalty driven group and may be included in the concepts 
that address each of the three FOMs discussed.  The FOMs that are covered are 
observability, sensor reliability/sensor fault robustness and fault detectability/fault 
discrimination. 
2.3.1.Observability.  A system’s ability to provide information about its state 
with respect to performance monitoring, health assessment, and control of the system is 
of paramount importance.   Some strategies define the degree of observability by 
analyzing a state space model that represents the process of interest.  Van den Berg, et al. 
(2000) define the criteria for degrees of observability by determining the amount of 
signal received by a sensor for a system configuration of a tubular chemical reactor.  
Optimal sensor locations for the reactor are found by specifying scalar measures on the 
observability Gramian integral from the linear least-squares state estimation problem.  
Muller (1972), similarly, develops scalar metrics from the observability matrix to define 
the degree of observability for linear dynamical systems.  Dochain, et al. (1997) identify 
a criterion that is the condition number of the observability matrix of the linearized 
tangent model of the discretized model of fixed bed bioreactors. 
Other approaches to display degrees of observability use graph-based approaches 
that capture the architectural information of a given system.  Two graph-oriented 
algorithms for observability and redundancy classification were proposed by Kretsovalis 
(1987).  Luong, et al. (1994) establish an incidence matrix using graph-based analysis.  
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The incidence matrix related process relationships to the state variables qualitatively. 
Identification of unmeasured variables and determination of whether a measured variable 
was redundant is accomplished by the decomposition of the incidence matrix.  
Bagajewitcz (1999) describes the degree of estimability that incorporates degrees of 
observability and redundancy to assess system variables that may be estimated by 
measurements.  A variable that is not measured is observable if it can be identified in at 
least one way from the measurements.  Similarly, a measurement is redundant if it can be 
found in at least one way from the remaining measurements. 
 There is a large body of work that focuses on identifying observability in 
structural type problems.  Papadopoulos (1998) proposes a scheme that selects the most 
linearly independent impulse responses at all candidate sensor locations from a Gram-
Schmidt orthogonalization procedure.  Also proposed is a scheme based on a principal 
component analysis and iteratively removes sensors that do not contribute significant 
information to the Fisher information matrix.  Hac (1993) uses quantitative measures of 
observability based on gramians to determine sensor locations in motion control of 
flexible structures.  By determining eigenvalues, obtained in closed form from 
corresponding gramians in each optimization step, an optimality criterion is established. 
 Some strategies for assessing system observability include utilizing prediction of 
error of a given sensor suite with respect to various parameters of interest.  Chmielewski, 
et al. (2002) propose a Nonlinear Program (NLP) that is independent of all decision 
variables.  The NLP can then be converted into a convex program through the use of 
linear matrix inequalities.  Using the results, sensor placement is established by standard 
interior-point and branch-and-bound search algorithms.  Musulin, et al. (2005) identify 
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sensor suite observability by maximizing Kalman filtering performance.  The 
measurement noise and observation matrices are manipulated to produce the parameters.  
Similarly, Mushini (2005), proposed maximizing a Kalman filter performance by 
utilizing a metric defined as a function of the steady state error-covariance and the cost of 
the selected sensors.  The optimal measurement sets for an aircraft gas turbine engine are 
then estimated.  Madron (1992) uses multiple Gauss-Jordan elimination of the system of 
linear mathematical model equations to generate classifications of observability for 
sensor suites. 
2.3.2.Sensor Reliability/Sensor Fault Robustness.  Observability and 
detectability become useless if measurements are not available to make the detections.  
Being able to identify how reliably a system can make detections for fault diagnosis is of 
considerable importance.  Therefore it is important to be acquainted with strategies for 
assessing the reliability and fault robustness of sensors. 
 Considerable consideration has been made for assessing the performance of a 
sensor network in the presence of sensor faults.  Bagajewicz (1997) defines qualifying 
constraints that relate to certain requirements of data reconciliation with the goal of 
minimizing cost.  Error detectability is defined as the ability of the sensor network to 
detect sensor faults.  Availability is defined as the precision after a failed sensor is 
removed.  Resilience is defined as precision in the presence of a sensor fault.  These 
constraints define the ability of a sensor network to perform in the presence of a sensor 
fault.  Bagajewicz (2002) then extends this research to include explicit Mixed Integer 
Nonlinear Program (MINLP) formulation.  Hardware redundancy is then taken into 
account as an extension of the theory represented in this work.   
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 Some researchers define the reliability of an instrumentation system as the 
probability that information required for control are available through measurements or 
deduction during a given time period.  Using this definition, Loung, et al. (1994) compute 
the number of sensor failures conserving the observability of the variables required for 
control.  This is done by classification of various parameters needed for control.  
Competing networks are compared by integration of the time profile for each sensor 
network. 
 Yet other researchers identify the concept of sensor reliability as the reliability of 
the availability of measurements to provide system state estimations.  Ali (1993) focuses 
on identifying how robustly a sensor network can handle failures and still estimate a 
variable.  Using a graph-theoretic algorithm, globally optimum solutions are generated 
for realistic processes.  Later, Ali (1995) adds to the algorithm to identify the optimal 
design for a redundant sensor network for linear processes.  This algorithm accounts for 
specifications of measurable variables.  Sen, et al. (1998) use genetic algorithms to allow 
for multiple performance metrics to be evaluated along with the optimization of objective 
functions with a single criterion.  Similarly, Bagajewicz (2000), used MINLP to provide 
for multiple metrics, such as cost to be optimized along with reliability. 
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2.3.3.Fault Detectability/Fault Discriminability.  While observabiliy provides 
information about state parameters required for making a system health diagnosis, fault 
detection and discriminability define the sensor network’s ability to distinguish off 
nominal from nominal operation and the ability to distinguish these faults from each 
other, respectively.  Observability, detectability and discriminability are all necessary to 
be able to process sensor data and to make a system health diagnosis.   
 Some research focuses on using system behavioral models and reliability data to 
assess sensor placement.  Azam, et al. (2004) propose using such a model along with 
fault probabilities and effects of faults on observable system parameters to evaluate a 
sensor suite.  Fault effect information is translated into cause-effect dependencies and 
detection probabilities are then computed.  Multiple Fault Diagnosis (MFD) algorithms 
search for the most likely candidate fault subset that best explains the set of observed 
discrepancies from the bipartite graph model.  Optimal sensor allocation is then 
performed after a set of performance measures are calculated using the candidate fault 
subset.  The optimization was performed using surrogate cutting and constraint pairing-
based method. 
 Santi, et al. (2005) propose a detection strategy for rocket propulsion systems in 
which thresholds are used to determine off–nominal behavior.  Measurements from 
multiple sensor sources must exceed a prescribed threshold limit for reliable fault 
detection.  A minimum measurement deviation level for that fault detection within a 
defined false alarm limit is designated as the detection threshold limit.  Figure 2.1 shows 
the detectable fault zone that is the measurement space area where the outputs from two 
  
13 
sensors exceed a detection threshold limit.  A fault becomes detectable when its 








 There is much research that focuses on assessing detectability by qualitatively 
analyzing the fault propagation process.  Several researchers including Raghuraj, et al 
(1999), Bushan (2000), and Bagajewicz, et al. (2004) use directed graphs, or digraphs, to 
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represent faults in a system.  Faults are related to sensors through dependencies modeled 
by the digraphs.  This graph provides an indication of which sensors should respond to 
which faults.  Spanache, et al. (2004) capture the behavior of a system through a series of 
constraints that represent the limitations imposed on the evolution of the variables.  The 
constraints and fault signatures that are assigned to failed components are then used to 
establish a component oriented fault signature matrix.  Similarly, Narasimhan, et al. 
(1998) identify qualitative fault signatures by establishing temporal causal graphs derived 
from a bond graph model.  The temporal causal graph is a directed graph, where vertices 
are the system variables and the edges represent the causal relationship between these 
variables qualified by the temporal characteristics of the relation.   
Yan (2004) uses the CAD environment to implement a diagnosability analysis for 
sensor placement.  In this work the fault signature matrix is found by projections of 
different operation modes on observable variables.  While these qualitative methods 
represent a straightforward strategy for relating system faults to effects, there are several 
researchers that chose to incorporate more fault information in hopes of augmenting these 
useful techniques.  Zhang (2005) proposes a Quantified Directed Graph (QDG) in hopes 
of capturing quantitative information to model the behavior of a system.  In a QDG, each 
node represents a sensor location with a signal to noise ratio.  A sensor detectability 
measure was then calculated for each sensor and then evaluated against an assigned lower 
bound.  The qualitative methods presented here are ideal for identification of fault 
signatures to analyze sensor placement during the early design stages of complex 
systems.  These methods are also preferable because they are less expensive than 




2.4. FAILURE ANALYSIS METHODS 
 
Failure Analysis is an integral part of identifying a sensor suite’s ability to detect 
fault in a system.  Being able to identify the ways in which a failure mode manifests itself 
as a fault within a system yields information about what measurements need to be taken 
to isolate the failure.  There are a couple of failure analysis techniques that are regarded 
as the standard in failure assessment in the aerospace industry.  Tumer (2003) points out 
that Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is the standard failure analysis method 
used in design.  FMEA is a risk assessment technique for systematically identifying 
potential failures in a system or process.  System experts identify failure modes for each 
component within a system.  Effects are also recorded for each of these failure modes.  
One of the shortfalls of the FMEA approach is that there is little attempt at assessing 
failure propagation times for each of the failure modes.  When fault propagation time 
numbers are identified they are usually too coarse to make design decisions with. FMEA 
may indicate time to criticality as instant, seconds, minutes, hours, or even longer periods 
of time. This provides an idea of how fast a fault propagates to a critical condition, but 
does not give any exact numbers. 
 Another failure analysis approach commonly implemented for complex systems 
during the design stages is Fault Tree Analysis (FTA).  Bahr (1997) indicates that fault 
trees are widely used not only in reliability analysis, but also in safety analysis because of 
their ability to account for failure beyond single part malfunctions.  FTA is a failure 
analysis in which a critical state of a system is indicated as the top node in the tree.  
Using Boolean logic the top node event trees out to lower level events that are causes of 
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the higher level events.  While FTA represents an invaluable tool for evaluating the 
events that lead up to a failure, they fall short in that they do not address how fast these 
events ultimately manifest themselves as the undesired situation.   
On the other end of the spectrum of strategies for identifying propagation times is 
physics based simulation.  These simulations yield precise numbers that may be used to 
accurately assess a system’s ability to handle candidate failure scenarios.  Simulations 
that have the fidelity to produce these numbers are usually very expensive and time 
consuming to produce.  Another shortfall in the implementation of these simulations is 
that there has to be a great deal of design information available for production of a model 
that can yield the type of timing information that is desired to evaluate a sensor suite’s 
ability to detect a fault. 
 
2.5. PROPOSED APPROACH 
 
All of the failure analysis techniques mentioned are not necessarily implemented 
during the early stages of design.  A sufficient level of design maturity is needed to be 
able to generate both FMEA, FTA and physics based simulation. FMEA usually requires 
more information about the components to be able to accurately identify the ways in 
which specific components may fail.  Physics based simulation needs more information 
to be able to generate equations to accurately represent the system.   
The proposed approach, Fault Propagation Timing Analysis (FPTA), may be 
implemented during the early design stages of a system to make evaluations of sensor 
suites.  During conceptual development when there is an idea of the type of components 
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that a system might have, these configurations may be represented in directed graphs and 
an FPTA analysis can be completed to evaluate sensor placement.  
FPTA is an augmentation of some of the directed graph approaches mentioned in 
section 2.1.1.3. of this thesis and contributes directly to the detectability evaluation of a 
sensor suite.  Previous digraph approaches did a good job of relating faults to sensors 
through modeled dependencies, but failed in providing a sense for how much time it took 
for that fault to reach a sensor.  This research outlines an approach for assigning 
propagation times to the dependencies of the digraph in order to evaluate how long it 
takes for a fault to become detectable by a sensor.  A natural addition to this concept is 
that a propagation time can be identified for a fault to reach a critical condition.  
Comparison of the time to criticality and the time to detect allows for a quantitative 
evaluation of a candidate sensor suite’s ability to detect a failure mode. 




3. RESEARCH METHOD   
To support sensor suite assessment with respect to a system’s ability to identify 
off-nominal behavior before a critical state is reached I propose Fault Propagation Timing 
Analysis (FPTA).  The analysis is presented as a series of steps to follow for sensor suite 
evaluation implementation on a system. 
 
3.1. STEP 1: BUILD DIRECTED GRAPH 
 
To complete an FPTA, a directed graph must be built for the system to be 
instrumented.  Inputs that are needed to build the graph include, but are not limited to, 
system schematics, drawings, illustrations, concept of operations, and expert solicitation.  
The nodes of the graph represent the components of the system that have the potential for 
failure.  The arcs represent fault propagation paths of the system.  Components are 
arranged and connected to model the interactions that represent the functional 
dependencies of the system.  For instance, an electric motor generates mechanical energy 
to be transferred through a gearbox to a wheel.  The directed graph for this system is 
illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
 
 




Fault propagation paths can be a superset of two types of flows within a system.  
There are nominal system flows and flows that may occur as a result of off-nominal 
behavior.  The nominal system flows are usually easy to identify.  These nominal flows 
might be the energy, signal, or mass flows that are functionally intended to flow between 
components to provide for overall system functionality.  The nominal flows usually 
represent the majority of paths that a fault may propagate within a system.  For example, 
if an electrical wire breaks, electricity will fail to transfer to the appropriate components 
within the system.  The effects of the failed wire would propagate through the system 
following nominal paths, that is, there will be a lack of power to downstream 
components.  The off-nominal system flows that occur as a result of a failure are usually 
more difficult to identify.  These flows must be represented by arcs to directly address the 
effect of that failure.  For example, if a battery overheats and explodes, an off-nominal 
system flow might be modeled as an arc from the battery to any components that may be 
affected by the explosion.  If the system was working the way it was intended to perform, 
there would be no arcs from the battery to these components.  The objective is to capture 
all potential fault propagation paths that may occur within a system. 
 
3.2. STEP 2: IDENTIFY POTENTIAL FAILURE MODES 
 
FPTA analysis relies on understanding the ways a system may fail.  The extent to 
which failure modes are identified within a system is dependent on the desired capability 
of the candidate sensor suites.  When completing FPTA analysis on complex systems that 
have potentially expensive consequences of failure, it is desired to comprehensively 
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identify failure modes with the goal of assessing sensor suite detection capabilities for 
any given failure scenario. Failure modes are identified for each of the components that 
are modeled.  Any off-nominal condition that the component has the possibility of 
encountering may be considered a failure mode.  The condition is identified as a failure 
mode when the failure effects cause off-nominal behavior to be seen at components that 
are located downstream from the failed component in the digraph.   
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is an excellent source of this type of 
failure information that is generally available for complex systems.  FMEA is a risk 
assessment technique for systematically identifying potential failures in a system or 
process.  Failure modes are identified for each component within a system.  Effects are 
also recorded for each of these failure modes.  These effects aid in the identification of 
fault propagation paths.   
While FMEA offers a valuable bottom-up approach to potential system failure 
identification, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a top-down method.  FTA identifies a critical 
event that is defined as the “top event” and then trees out to reveal potential causes of that 
event.  Paths of the tree pass through Boolean logic gates that define which lower level 
events may lead to the “top event”.  The lower levels of the fault tree that identify 
potential failure sources that lead to the critical event are then related to component 
failures that may be represented in the FPTA digraph.  
Once failure modes are identified, using whichever approach deemed appropriate, 
fault propagation paths may be developed.  The failure modes represent the initiation of a 
given fault propagation path.  The faults that result from these failure modes also define 
which dependencies represented in the digraph are valid propagations.  The determination 
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of these paths is made from understanding the effects of each of the failure modes and is 
discussed in section 2.4 of this thesis. 
 
3.3. STEP 3: INSERT SENSORS 
 
After a directed graph is completed that models all of the components and 
dependency paths of a system, candidate sensor suites may be inserted.  A sensor is seen 
as another component in a directed graph of a system.  The arcs, or fault propagation 
paths, that are inputs to the sensors follow the same conventions as described earlier.  
Any signal, energy, or mass flow that a given sensor is intended to measure is drawn as 
an arc from a component in the system to that sensor.  The component that the arc is 
drawn from may be the component where that sensor is physically located, or it may be a 
component that the sensor is intended to directly measure.   Sensors will sometimes not 
have outputs because faults caused by failure modes in the system will usually propagate 
along nominal flow paths.  Sensor nodes may have output ports if there are failure modes 
that need to be taken into account for the system due to the existence of the sensor.  For 
instance, a pressure sensor located on a combustion chamber represents a potential gas 
leakage point if failure occurs.  A significant consideration has to made for the sensor 
failing to make a detection as well.  This failure may manifest itself in several ways such 
as a detection failing off-scale or sensor drift.  These types of failures can be common 
and should therefore be accounted for.   
While sensors have the possibility of failing, the ability of a system to overcome a 
sensor failure in order to make a failure determination is out of the scope of this work. 
There have been several strategies developed for allocating sensors and for processing 
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data from those sensors to accurately diagnose a system’s health in the presence of sensor 
faults.  The goal of this work is to be able to assess how well a given sensor suite can 
detect a critical fault in a timely manner.  The strategy described in this thesis takes into 
account the time for a fault to propagate to a sensor, and the time it takes for any given 
sensor to realize that the fault has occurred.  The time for a sensor to identify the fault in 
the system incorporates all sensor latencies associated with time constants, red lines, etc.  
It is not intended to be able to assess the time it takes to process the data to make a health 
status determination.   
 
3.4. STEP 4: IDENTIFY CRITICAL FAILURE POINTS 
 
It is desired to assess sensor placement to identify failures before the fault leads to 
an expensive consequence. If time to criticality is known, it may be compared to the time 
to detect to make a determination of sensor suite effectiveness. FPTA analysis allows for 
a time to criticality assessment.  It is necessary to understand the way the system can fail 
and what the effects of these failures will be to identify points of criticality.  Points of 
criticality represent locations within a system that off-nominal behavior will manifest 
itself as an expensive consequence.  For instance, when a valve fails to open, the 
immediate effects associated with that valve failing may not be critical.  But when a 
combustion chamber downstream of that valve fails to receive fuel, this represents a point 
of criticality.  The scenario becomes critical when the combustion chamber behavior 
becomes off nominal because those consequences are more significant than upstream 
effects of the failure.   
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The points of criticality may be modeled as nodes in the directed graph.  The 
input is any flow that may demonstrate the symptoms of off-nominal behavior from a 
component.  There will usually be no outputs of the points of criticality because these 
nodes represent where a propagation path will terminate.  There are scenarios though 
where there may be two critical failures that can lead to a more crucial consequence.  In 
such a case one could model fault propagation paths from each of the critical failures to 
another point of criticality that represents the more crucial consequence.   
 
3.5. STEP 5: IDENTIFY FAULT PROPAGATION PATHS 
 
To identify which sensors have the opportunity of detecting off-nominal behavior 
of a system due to a failure, it is necessary to know the path in which a given fault may 
propagate.  Propagation paths are generated by tracking dependency paths that are 
modeled in the directed graph of a system.  Any failure that occurs in a component, or 
node, of the graph will propagate along the arcs that point to downstream components 
that are affected by the propagation of the fault.  For any fault of interest, a path may be 
traced from the component along the arcs and nodes until a critical point is reached.   
 
3.6. STEP 6: IMPLEMENT TIMING ANALYSIS 
 
The timing analysis identifies the time it takes from initiation of the failure mode 
to the manifestation of the critical fault.  The analysis also identifies the time it takes for 
the off-nominal flows of the system to be detected by a given sensor suite.  The failure 
propagation path is populated with times that represent how fast the fault propagates 
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through the system.  Times are identified for each arc and node in the graph.  Times that 
are identified for the arcs represent the time it takes for a fault to propagate from the 
output of one component to the input of the next component.  Times that are identified 
for a module represent the time it takes for a fault to propagate from the input of a 
component to the output of that component.   
Depending on the goals of the timing analysis, there are several strategies for 
producing these propagation times.  During the early design process the numbers may be 
generated by expert solicitation.  The digraph represents an early conceptual formulation 
of a system and a subject matter expert may be asked how long it would take a fault to 
propagate from one point to another.  The times would be inserted into the digraph and 
the timing analysis would identify potential issues that may be resolved during 
subsequent design cycles. 
In order to accurately assess a sensor suite with respect to its ability to detect 
faults in a timely manner it is desired to use a high fidelity approach to producing the 
propagation times for insertion to the digraph.  Such an approach would include physics 
based simulation of a system.  A fault condition may be simulated and the propagation 
time can be identified by analyzing the simulation parameters that are located 
downstream of the component that failed.  Accurate propagation times may also be 
produced from calculations that take system characteristics into account.  For instance, a 
propagation time can be identified for a system where liquids flow through conduit by 
dividing the speed at which the liquid is moving by the length of conduit.  
There is a notion of characteristic propagation times as well.  If the underlying 
physical mechanisms by which the faults propagate are known there may be a 
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characteristic time of propagation that accurately captures the way the system behaves.  
For example, electrical faults typically propagate at speeds determined by the 
transportation of electrons through wire.  Some characteristic times for various functional 
flows are shown in table 3.1. 
 
 
Table 3.1. Characteristic Propagation Times 
Functional Flow Characteristic Time 
Electrical Energy 1-10 milliseconds 
Data computation 10-100 milliseconds 
Fluid flow 5-30 milliseconds 
Radiative Heat Transfer Minutes to hours 




Regardless of what fidelity is needed for the propagation times that are inserted 
into the graph, an evaluation of a sensor suite may be performed to identify its ability to 
identify faults before they become critical.  Times identified for each of the arcs and 
nodes are summed as the propagation path is followed.  Conclusions may then be drawn 





The Rocketdyne RS-68 rocket engine is presented here to demonstrate Fault 
Propagation Timing Analysis (FPTA).  According to Wood [2002] the RS-68 is the first 
new U.S. engine certified to fly since the Space Shuttle Main Engine over 20 years ago.  
The RS-68 powers the Delta IV Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV).  It is 
planned to use 5 RS-68 engines to power the Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV) of 
NASA’s Project Constellation.  The RS-68 is a complex system with expensive 
consequences of failure.  FPTA is performed to assess candidate sensor suites with 
respect to timely critical failure detection within the RS-68.  The analysis follows the 
steps outlined in the previous chapter. 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION TO THE RS-68 
 
The RS-68 burns liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen in a gas generator cycle.  The 
engine has the capability of transitioning between full power and a minimum power level 
as commanded from the vehicle.  The engine supplies gasses to pressurize the fuel and 
oxidizer propellant tanks.  The RS-68 also provides for thrust vector and roll control by 
gimballing the thrust chamber and the fuel turbine exhaust roll control nozzle.  Turbo-
pumps are directly powered through a single shaft by turbines.  A gas generator powers 
the turbines in parallel with high-pressure hot gas combusted from propellants tapped off 
after the pumps.  The engine has an ablative nozzle with a lining that is designed to burn 
away as the engine runs, dissipating heat.  The RS-68 engine operating characteristics 





Figure 4.1. RS-68 Operating Characteristics 
 




4.2. STEP 1: BUILD RS-68 DIGRAPH  
 
FPTA analysis is initiated on the RS-68 by building a directed graph, or digraph, 
to represent the architecture of the rocket engine.  Components that represent failure 
sources for the engine are the nodes of the graph.  Nominal flow paths between the 
components are modeled as the arcs of the digraph.  These flows represent the functional 
dependencies between the components of the engine.  The arcs are distinguished into 
three categories of flow types.  Flows representing energy dependencies between 
components such as electrical and mechanical energy flows are represented by thin solid 
arrows.  Thick solid arrows represent mass flows such as solid, gas, or liquid flows.  Thin 
dashed arrows represent data flows that signify control signals or sensor data.  A digraph 





Figure 4.3. RS-68 Digraph 
 
 
4.3. STEP 2: IDENTIFY FAILURE MODES OF RS-68 
 
To analyze fault propagation times of the RS-68, it is essential to identify the 
ways in which the system may fail.  Failure modes are identified for each of the 
components that are modeled.  A list of failure modes and effects associated with some of 
the components identified in the RS-68 digraph are presented in Table 1 of the Appendix.  
Immediate, downstream, and end effect are identified for each of the failure modes in this 
example FMEA.  The failure mode and effect information is used to guide the FPTA 
process as the propagation paths and effect nodes are analyzed.   
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4.4. STEP 3: INSERT CANDIDATE SENSOR SUITE 
 
Candidate sensor suites may now be inserted into the digraph.  An example sensor 
suite implemented on a rocket engine in order to initiate a shutdown in response to a 
critical failure is shown in table 4.1.  A snapshot of the RS-68 digraph with the fuel pump 
discharge pressure and Fuel Turbo-Pump (FTP) shaft speed sensor inserted is displayed 
in Figure 4.4.  The arcs that connect a component to the sensor represent the flow that is 
measured.  For instance, the FTP shaft speed sensor measures the mechanical energy of 
the turbine shaft.  Therefore a link that represents that mechanical energy is drawn from 
the turbo-pump to the sensor.  
 
Table 4.1. Example Candidate Red-line Sensor List for the RS-68 
Sensor Location 
Fuel Pump Discharge Pressure FTP discharge duct just after the pump 
Fuel Turbine Temperature Hot gas inlet duct to the fuel turbine 
Main Combustion Chamber Pressure At the top of the combustion chamber 
Fuel turbo-pump shaft speed FTP 










4.5. STEP 4: IDENTIFY CRITICAL FAILURE POINTS OF THE RS-68 
 
To identify fault propagation paths it is desired to identify the critical failure 
points that represent the costly consequences of a failure within a system.  The example 
RS-68 FMEA located in Appendix A is a source of information that may facilitate the 
identification of the critical points in the digraph.  For example, when the gas generator 
fuel valve exhibits the failure mode of being stuck closed, there is no fuel flow to the gas 
generator combustion chamber.  This condition potentially leads to an explosion at the 
chamber due to oxygen rich conditions because the oxidizer valve allows oxidizer to flow 
without the fuel needed for complete combustion.  This represents a critical consequence 









4.6. STEP 5: IDENTIFY FAULT PROPAGATION PATHS 
 
The RS-68 digraph now has the essential elements that are needed to identify fault 
propagation paths that may then be used to initialize the timing analysis.  A component 
along with a failure mode is chosen to implement the timing analysis.  A failure of 
interest might be the pump head loss of the oxidizer turbo-pump.  The effect of this 
failure eventually leads to a low thrust condition of the engine.  The propagation path 
begins with the fuel turbo-pump and follows the flow dependencies modeled in the 
system to the critical failure point of low thrust that would be seen as an output of the 
nozzle.  The propagation path may be seen in Figure 4.6.  The propagation path indicates 
that there are potentially three sensors that can pick up the fault at different points in the 





Figure 4.6. RS-68 FTP Head Efficiency Loss Propagation Path 
 
 
4.7. STEP 6: IMPLEMENT RS-68 TIMING ANALYSIS 
 
To implement FPTA timing analysis the graph must be populated with fault 
propagation times for each arc and node.  These propagation times will allow for 
determination of the time it takes for a fault to reach each component, sensor, and effect 
node in the graph.  The fault propagation path for the RS-68 fuel turbo-pump head loss 
efficiency failure with propagation times identified is shown in Figure 4.7.  A 
propagation time of 28 ms is indicated for the hydrogen flow from the fuel turbo-pump to 
the main fuel valve.  The 28 ms represents the time from when the head loss first occurs 








4.8. RS-68 FPTA CONCLUSIONS 
 
There are several conclusions that may be drawn from the FPTA analysis of the 
RS-68 fuel turbo-pump head loss.  First, there are several sensors in the propagation path 
that should have the ability of detecting the fault before it becomes critical.  The off-
nominal pressure may be sensed by the FTP fuel discharge pressure sensor within 4 ms of 
failure.  The fault is sensed by the MCC pressure sensor 83 ms after the failure.  This is 
not the end of the story for the sensors though.  There are time constants that must be 
taken into account.  In most cases the off-nominal flow will have to exceed a red-line 
before a fault will be recognized.  This represents another latency that must be accounted 
for to complete an accurate assessment of detectability.  These times may then be 
included in the digraph and the resulting sensor suite assessment will provide a time to 
detect measure.  The FPTA analysis indicates that it takes 2.083 seconds for there to be a 
critical loss of thrust due to the FTP failure.  The FPTA analysis allows for the time to 
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detect to be compared to the time to criticality for several sensor suites, therefore 
providing system designers with a strategy for assessing sensor suites with respect to 




In this thesis, a strategy for evaluating a sensor suite’s effectiveness in detecting 
faults before they become critical has been presented.  Fault Propagation Timing 
Analysis (FPTA), is a flexible approach to evaluating sensor placement for a system 
during various stages of design.  Complex systems that have expensive consequences of 
failure, such as those in the aerospace industry, benefit from the concepts that are 
presented.  FPTA was performed on Rocketdyne’s RS-68 rocket engine to illustrate how 
the strategy may be implemented to compare the time to detect to the time to criticality. 
The work presented in this thesis describes FPTA as an augmentation to several 
detectability evaluation strategies that may be implemented through the use of directed 
graphs.  While previous approaches using digraphs were able to relate faults to sensors, 
FPTA goes further by attaching fault propagation times to the dependencies modeled in 
the graph.  The propagation times may then be analyzed to identify time to detect and 
time to criticality.  These metrics allow for an evaluation of a sensor suite’s ability to 
detect a fault before it becomes critical. 
 FPTA is being utilized to assess the detection capabilities of NASA’s Ares I 
launch vehicle.  The analysis has successfully produced results that are being accounted 
for in the vehicle’s design cycles.  Details of outputs derived from the analysis are 
proprietary and are therefore not available in this work.   
 There are several challenges that exist in the further development of FPTA.  
While the analysis described in this thesis can identify the time it takes for off-nominal 
behavior of a system due to a failure to be sensed by a given sensor suite, there is no 
assessment of a time to process and provide a response to the failure.  An extension to the 
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fault propagation timing work would be development of a strategy for identifying the 
time from failure detection to corrective action initiation as well as the time it takes for 
the corrective action to take place.  The identification of these propagation times would 
allow a designer to make a comprehensive assessment of a system’s ability to respond to 
any failure with the goal of avoiding critical consequences.   
 The successful implementation of FPTA is dependent on the failure data that is 
available for a system.  An area of work that can support the development of useful 
FPTAs would be the development of a systematic approach to identifying cross 
subsystem failure modes.  While modeling dependency paths in a digraph that represent 
nominal system behavior is usually straightforward, the identification of dependencies 
representing off-nominal failure propagation is a challenging proposition.  Cross 
subsystem failures are very commonly not accounted for because of the nature of current 
design practices.  If there were a strategy to account for these potential failures, an FPTA 
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